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Formal coibat modals are a means for military
analysts and planners to support decisions coQcerning
military projects. The reality, validity and
credibility of combat, aodels is still a contuDversial
subject. This paper provides a discussion of the
process of gaining fire superiority in combat. Three
different input parameter categories - tactical,
technical, and human parameters - were selected to
serve as cDmbat iiput. The combat environment
transforms these inputs into combat outputs (dc combat
effects) in the form of operational, target and human
effects. Human effects are the suppressive or
psychological effects, whereas target effects are only
physical effects, A conceptual model of fire
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I. INTRODJCTION
A. CaSDIBILITY PROBLEMS DF COMBAT MODELS
Although Operations Sasearch has isvsloped focmal combat
medals that are ia active ise tDday, chesa modsls have not
always JDeen readily accepted by DOth military analysts and
planners, bcaase of certain difficulties that ara inherent
in any combat aodel. Today's spactrum of focaal combar
models reaches from smalL-scale, small-anit-action models to
aggregated large-scale theater- level models. Hiacarchies of
models have even been developed; and in such model
hierarchies, the outputs of small- scale analytical models
have bean used as inputs into large- scale analytical
models. :'Iodeling efforts were initially intandad to yield
"point" solutions to spacific combat problems. Later,
because of the infeasibility of this goal, they simply
provided insight into battle dynamics, FE3A movement, force
structures, equipment, weaponry, weapon mixes, tactics and
doctrine. Generally speaicing, combat models have provided
insights into battle without having a war.
The question at hand is, whether the models are reliable
and credible enough to produce usafui and realistic results
whica may later influence defense-planning decisions. The
problem has baan to iacorporata the qualitative factors,
that military esperts feel are decisive In combat
operations, into a mataematical modal. This means: Is small
scale combat understood clearly enough and is sufficient
detail incorporated into models? This is also raflected in

the need for a theory of combat , i better systematical
understanding of combat. Taylor ] Sef. 1] and the analysis
community consider the de/elopment of such a theory to be a
necessary prerequisite f^c any really viable modal. Another
problem with combat models is their verification. The
general scientific approach to proceed from = hypothesis
through experimentation to theory is, for very obvious
reasons, impossible with respect to combat operations.
Therefore, two major alternative approaches to verification
have been used; the internal consistency check and the
empirical professional judgement. Unfortunately, the latter
has a strong bias towards the preferences and point of view
of the judging person. The willingness to accept any model
solution or outcome at all depends on the degree of
probability that the model outcome is realistic.
Unrealistic results are not proof of the invalility of the
theoretical approach to combat. It should not discourage
the attempt to conceptualize real life problems, since
modern military thinking is now based very strongly on
scientific research and has received very valuable impetus,
trains of thoughts and concepts in this way. Jnrealistic
results of models may only show that the model inputs have
to be amended.
This thesis examines combat, in particular the fire
fight, in a rather basic -^ay. The combat process is viewed
from the "total systems" approach and a conceptual model of
fire superiority is developed.
B. STATEMENT OF- THE PROBLEM
It is the author's hypothesis that lani combat in
general and small-unit fire fights in particular are
normally won by fire superiority. It seems to be obvious

that either having fire superiority or gaining it against an
eflemy force is the key to success in many (if not most)
military operations. This is loosely implied ani explicitly
stated in the German Tactics Field Manual "HDv 1 CO/1 00^
giiehrunq ia Gefegh t" [ Ref . 2 ] in the chapters about defense
and attaclc. Interestingly enough there is apparently no
appreciation of this fundamental hypothesis by model
builders, since according to the best of the author's
knowledge this important phenomenon of fire superiority has
not been so far either implicitly or explicitly considered
in any combat model. Other important factors, responsible
for battle outcome, are widely considered as e.g. movement,
detection, attrition and suppression, to name but the more
important ones. Presumably the reason for this is the desire
of the modelers to keep the models simple and accessable as
well as minimizing the difficulties in quantifying the
determining variables and states in the combat situation
considered. This significant emission is probably due to
the lack, of any conceptual model of fire superiority. This
situation itself is caused by the absence of any useful
definition in the military literature which couli serve as a
basis for investigating ths contribution of fire superiority
to combat effectiveness. The German field manual "HDv
lQQ.Z2Q.^x. Fuehrunqsbeqrif f e" [Ref. 3] which defines the major
terras of current military usage, omits any mention of fire
superiority with the explanation being given in the preface
that:" It has been renounced to define terms which are self
evident without explanation". For very similar reasons a
definition of fire superiority cannot be found in the
"Dictionary of military and Associated Terms" published by
the Joint Chiefs Df Staff of U.S. Department of Defense.
The question obtrudes on the author that if it is so
self evident, what is exactly meant by fire superiority. The
lack of any existing widely-accepted definition leaves a
wide space for interpretation. Fire superiority seems to be

too comprahensi75 to allow two parsons to have the same
conceptual basis, though commonly the major aspects,
physical and sometimes also non physical components of fire
superiority are agreed upon.
Even Armies of different nations seem to have different
conceptions of fire superiority. In the case of the Germans
and the Americans this may arise from traditional
differences in military thinking. Apparently it roots in
different concepts of coiibat. The Germans use the command
concept of mission tactics and tend to emphasiza manpower
aspects of fire superiority, whereas the Americans tend to
use that of order tactics and rely more on the bare
firepower aspects of fire superiority.
An Army wants to win any battle. Therefore it must know the
variables which determine the gaining of fire superiority.
In order to influence the bartle outcome towards the desired
results, an Army must know which of the combat input
variables can deliberately be picked and changed. For these
reasons it seems to be necessary to have at least a
description of fire superiority, if not: a conceptual model.
The analyst dealing with fire superiority must try to
reconstrucn the internal wiring of the "black box" called
combat. Combat inputs ace transformed in this "black box"
into combat outputs, also called combat effects. Because of
this importance the analyst is also forced to have a
meaningful conceptual definition as a basis for a scientific
approactt to his modeling efforts.
The goal of tais thesis is to increase the military OR
community's understanding of fire superiority by describing
fire superiority, analyzing it, and then developing a
concept-ual model. Hopefully, this investigation (both its
analysis and conceptual model) sets the stage for future
work, possibly even the ievelopment of a quantitative model
of fire superiority. Thus, better combar models might be
developed for defense planning purposes.
10

LIMITATIONS OF THIS ?DRK
Fire superiority is-aa extremely complex phenomenon. It
exists whenever a battle is fought, whether in large scale
operations or in small scale combat. Large-scale combat is
characterized by the size of the force involved, by the
variety and magnitude of weapons employed, and by the fire
power delivered. This distinguishes large-scale combat from
small-scale combat.. The latter possesses greater homogeniny
of units and weapons. This results in relative uniformity
of the fire fight at the small unit level. Closer scrutiny,
however, reveals that the large scale combat is similar to
small scale combat if a small enough sector of the
battlefield is considered. vJeapons and armor may be
individually different, of course, but the characteristics
are approximately the same. Therefore a description of fire
superiority in general can be attempted, because the
mechanics and human reactions of both large and small-scale
combat are almost identical.
The scope of this thesis will be restricted to the
relatively simple and clear cut battle cases of attaclc,
defense and a meeting engagement. Aspects of fire
superiority in small-scale combat, with heterogeneous
weapons and supporting fire, will not be considered. The
cases of withdrawal and delay are not taken into
consideration because of the difficulties in associating
fire superiority with Dae of the fighting parties. Of
course, non fighting missions such as reconnaissance or




An extensive DDC iiteratare search and additional search by
the author in the NPS library have yielded no references
relating to this important topic. Thus, a listing of
research studies, literature^ or modeling approaches is
impossible. Work, dealiag vith the investigation of fire
superiority has been initiated, however, by the Deputy Chief
of Staff for military operations (DAMO-ZD) , Headquarters,
Department of the Armyi.
1 This fact was communicated to the author during a
telephone conversation with L TC r. Gill, Headquarters,
Department of the Army (DAMO-ZD) , on July 18, 1979.
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II. THE gHENQ-HSNON OF FIRS SaPERIORITY
A. GENERAL VIEW OF FIRE SOPEEIORITI
Usually/ whenever someone defines fire superiority, it
is described as the state resulting from the physical
effects of firing weapons in combat. Additionally people
sometimes include the psychological effects of fire.
Suppression studies ha^e indicated that psychological
effects are considered to be integral part of fire
superiority. However, this is nowhere explicitly stated in
the documentation of aodeling attempts. Apart from this, no
such understanding of fire superiority with its complex
spectrum of distinct factors and variables exists. This is
because the influence of human parameters is almost never
mentioned. To provide an initial point of departure, the
definition of M. B. Gardsr and P. S. Bond [Ref, 4] will be
helpful:
A fire which is superior to that of the enemy in volume
or accuracy or both and whose effect is to render the
enemy's lire less effective. Fire superiority is
relative and is a moral phenomenon although largely
dependent on physical effect. Fire superiority for the
attacker is implied if ae is able to advance against the
defender without ruinous losses. Fire superiority for
the defender is implied if he is able to hold his ground
and check, the attackers advance.
13

0ns should also be aware that fire superiority depends on
the social and cultural values of the soldiers engaged in
combat. This means that the perception of having achieved
the state of fire superiority depends on the value a society
attributes to human life, i.e. how many losses can be
incurred in order to achieve fire supsriority or before fire
superiority is lost.
B. THE ROLE OF FIRE SUPERIORITY IN 3MTLE
Starting with the ibove definition, the author would
like to present his perception of fira superiority. Its
location in the complex structure of combat is bised on the
individual's view of combat as seen from his perspective
with varying degrees of resolution. These varied
perspectives, of course, yield a view of combat composed of
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when one ideally considers combat, he will notice the
mission - objective relation. Missions govern the
battlefield, i.e. create the canalized and synchronized
violence. They asiially specify an objective which has to be
achieved within some time limit.
After a closer look one can discern two sides. The
friendly and the enemy side are opposed to one another
according to their respective missions and strive to achieve
their respective objectives in the preset time frames.
A fartaer looic reveals the sizes of the forces engaged,
their logistic capabilities, and their chosen tactic to
neutralize the opponent, i.e. to eliminate the obstacles
which impede the achievement of the objective and thus the
fulfillment of the mission in a timely manner. Generally
speaking, the enemy's mission (objective) is to prevent the
attainment of the mission (objective) of the friendly side.
This is especially true in the case of small unit-combat
after meeting the enemy. In other words, the missions as


















Figure 2 - MISSIDN - OBJECTIVE RELATION IN COMBAT
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Yet a aore detailed look reveals an interesting insight.
One finds here that at. a certain step or level the only
remaining battle determinant to achieve the objective is the
gaining of fire superiority, as figure 1 shows. This
dominant role of fire superiority is shown in figure 2 as
the crossover of enemy and friendly fire. Thus the
essential elements or factors in combat would appear to be
fire superiority.
Another interesting idea results from figure 1 . As soon
as the initial tactical estimates, as well as ths existing
materiel on hand, have determined the size of the force to
engage the enemy, these factors become invariable at the
instant combat commences. Initial force size can only be
changed or reinforced after reconsidering the inputs that
fire superiority can or can not be achieved with the present
force ratio. This idea of fixed initial force sizes and
missing reinforcement of units complies with the view of the
Lanchaster analytical combat models. It may also be seen
that fire superiority is a relative phenomenon dependent on
the sizes of the two opposing forces involved, the tactics
applied, and the supplies available to the two forces.
Thus it is possible to attribute the Icey role in combat
to fire superiority. Fire superiority is the key to success
in either level of command. The Commanding General is
concerned about fire superiority as well as the Platoon
Leader. Battle from the General's point of view is a
sequence of multiple aad simultaneously occuring combat
scenes with variable inputs in force size, tactics and
logistics. For the Platoon Leader all these factors are
initially fixed and can not be readily influenced during the
period of initial enemy contact, unless the platoon receives
reinforcements or supplies. Figure 1 yields a very useful
conceptual idea of platoon level combat if one replaces all
the developing factors by the initial factors of force size,
logistics and tactics for the friend's side as well as for
18

the enemy's side. Since the investigation of fire
superiority in small scale combat shows congraence of the
large and small-scale combat, only platoon level
considerations will be pursued further on without loss of
relevant detail.
C. COMPONENTS OF FIRE SJPERIORITY
The next steps in the investigation of fira superiority
deal with the questions, "what is firs superiority, what is
it composed of, what situations, variables or factors
influence it?" Because of the natura of fire superiority,
this part will be mainly descriptive. Tha multilayer
complexity of fire superiority simply does not allow one to
factor or subclassify terms and factors in a very clear cut
manner. The diffsrent terms and factors have correlations
and int erdependencies which make it difficult to decide
which term or factor influences which and in which logical
sequence. It is extremely difficult to make distinctions
between these different factors. Vary often the limits
where one factor ends and another begins are not clear. For
the sake of clarity and better understanding, as well as for
the purpose of factorization of parameters, these
distinctions have been oaade (though sometimes they may
appear somewhat artificial). This is, as initially
mentioned, a tribute to simplicity. Furthermore
difficulties arise from the fact that ttie enemy's
inferiority implies a friend's superiority. That is the
friend's more effective fire, relative to or minus the
enemy's less effective fire, makes up fire superiority.
Lastly, but most important, is the fact that tha real world
problem has interdependanc ies and mutually influencing
factors which the model can not represent.
19

Fire superiority may be considered to depend on three
parameters. These are tactical, technical, and human
parameters. They ail have to be viewed as battle input.
They can be quantified totally, partially, or not at all,
but are qualitatively known to the military to have a
considerable influence on battle outcome. although not
readily quantifiable, some parameters are known well enough
- not only to experienced combat veterans - but also to
analysts so that an attempt could be made to at least rank
order or classify them on an ordinal scale.
Tactical, technical and human parameters can conveniently be
described through the use of a tree diagram. They are the
initial branches which originate in the stem, called fire
superiority. Each of these main branches has other
subclassifying parameters with further sub-branchss.
During the course of a battle the combat inputs are
transformed into ::ombat outputs. The inputs determine the




1 • Ikl. I^LCtical Coipoaent
The tactical parametars are the first group of
factors which contribute to the gaining of fire superiority.
They consist of the mode of combat, the organization,
intelligence, and mobility. Because of combat action
restrictions, the combat mode consist of attacic and defense
only. The organization is described best by personnel and
material strength, force structure, deployment of units, and
supply and logistics. Intelligence is based on the
accessability of information via sensor hardware and on the
reconaissance capability. Mobility is determined, as before,
by the terrain, weather and transportation hardware,
tactical parameters may be considered environmental factors
in combat. Since the examination of fire superiority has
been restricted to platoon level engagements, it is
convenient to consider these combat inputs as initially
fixed. In the period of time immediately following a small
unit's engagement, the initial battle situation or
environment does not change, however, of course, battle
losses will decrease the initial quantity of personnel,
material and supplies on hand. However, under the
conditions of battle, the tactical parameters are




2. The Technical Component
In a similar fashion the second group of combat inputs, the
technical parameters, may be subdivided into subclasses,
which are essentially part of the principles of war:
namely. Mobility, Communication, and Firepower.
Mobility depends upon the terrain, the weather and
means of transportatioQ. Terrain is determined by the
topology and foliage cover which yields fire positions,
cover and concealment and traf ficability , Weather,
described very rigidly by humidity and temperature
influences traf ficability and may also contribute to cover
and concealment. The transportation hardware is defined by
the vehicle characteristics of armor protection,
transportability, engine capabilities and whether the
vehicle is self propelled or wheeled. The latter qualities
may also give protection by outmanouvering the enemy's fire,
thus reducing the vulnerability of the combatant. Mobility
also belongs to the category of tactical parameters.
The communication hardware set is composed of both
communication capabilities as well as countermeasure
capabilities. Further delineation of the coamunication
branch into subsequent subsets did not yield any relevant
insights other than an unneccessary differentiation of
communication equipment. Therefore it will be eliminated
from further consideration.
Firepower is also based upon the capabilities of the
hardware. As such it is determined by the ammunition, by
the guns or launchers and the sensors. The lethality of a
gun is determined by the caliber of the ammunition, the
fragmentation characteristics of the projectile, as well as
the range of the weapon itself. The resultant intensity
produced by the cadence and accuracy of the gun are, of
course, influenced by the state of training of the gunner as
well as the accuracy of the sensors to acquire targets.
22

The lethality and intensity of the fire is conveniently
collected under the term target effects, which are obviously
combat outputs.
3. The Human Component
The third group of factors, human parameters, are a very
important but often neglected group of factors.
Battles can not be won by machines without the soldier who
forcefully strives towards his objective. The best equipped
Army is useless unless the soldiers possess certain
qualities which enable thei to fight effectively. These
qualities are part of almost every man in a more or less
distinct form. ladividual, as well as group behaviour,
depends largely on these factors.
Group factors represent combat-unit parameters which appear
to be a sort of sociological factor that consist exclusively
of social oounds and behaviour forms like esprit de corps,
comradeship, feeling of solidarity, teamwork aad physical
communication in combat. The importance of physical
communication is emphasized by S.L. A. Marshal [aef. 5 ] in
his book " Men AqaJGSt Fire ":
A chief fault in our nen is that they do not talk. They
are not communicative. In combat they are almost tongue
tied. In Europe they were frequently astonished at the
incessant talking and shouting that went on among the
enemy formations during an action. They mistook it for
naivete in the Japanese that in combat they frequently
acted in the same way. That there was a direct
connection between these methods and the ptienomenal
vigor with which our enemies organized and pressed their
local counter attacks seems scarcely to have occured to
our side.
Individual factors are a collec-cive term for combatant
parameters and leadership parameters. These parameters
characterize, and also qualify, the tio distinct groups of
persons and their personalities in a combat unit.
Individual factors often are the reason for the success or
failure of an action.
23

The soldier, who is under fire, is the weakest and also the
most inflaenced linic in the chain of combat. His reactions
depend largely on his training, experience, morale, and
toughness. Of course all these factors in turn depend on
other distinct factors. These in turn may be influenced by
the battle impressions and may or may not undergo a change
in quality during combat periods.
A soldier is trained to show independence in his
decisions and actions, to possess initiative, and execute
those skills with flexibility. He is schooled in
discipline, reliability and obedience. His morale is based
an his self-confidence; spirit and mood. His stamina or
toughness is determined by his need for rest and comfort and
by his insusceptibility to the influence cf environmental
conditions. Physiological effects in the soldier may be
caused by fatigue, stress, strain, danger, threat, climate,
weather, temperature, humidity or enemy fire. A soldier's
toughness is furthermore dependent on his steadfastness in
situations replete with surprise, deception, disorganisation
and his steadfastness despite the intensity of battle and
the resulting confusion. Self confidence is based on the
feeling of eliteness, or superiority or inferiority to the
enemy, as well as on the trust in one's knowledge and
leadership. Self-confidence is mainly derived from previous
experience. The same pertains xo the spirit which is
dependent on ttie soldier's willingness, determination,
motivation, bravery, courage, self -discipline and
self-estimation. The mood of a soldier is determined by his
recent experience of success or failure, by his mentality,
aggressiveness, anger, fear, rage, despair, panic or even
paralysation. During a short fire fight all these factors
which influence morale can be considered fixed, but during a
long battle all these "mDrale" factors are variable and thus
can heavily influence the battle outcome.
24

The combat leader must have in addition to the
characteristic qaalities of the combat soldier, leadership
qualities. These include tactical skills and craftmanship
as well as flexibility, which is aariced by the ability to
improvise if necessary and to adapt, his command to changing
situations. Ha must possess a personality which shows
ingenuity. He must be accepted as a leader-model by the men
of his command. The leader must always be master of the
situation and able to ex=rt self control.
The human parameters described hereto are all
considered to be combat input parameters . This
presentation might be enriched by furrher factors not yet
considered, but it is also clear that the abundace of
distinct and different factors shown strongly suggests that
much more attention should be paid to the human parameters.
This is the more since it may be that these human factors
are not at all constant; possibly not even during the short
time frame of a combat action. k person endowed with all
these attributes when shot at will show human affacts which
unquestionably fall into the category of combat output.
Psychological affacts may also be produced by
actively delivering firepower. They may cause a feeling of
material superiority, activity and satisfaction and may help
to overcome a momentary weakness of morale and confidence.
They should not be confused with the psychological effects
involved whan fire is drawn, and which can increase or




The combat activities which comprise the human,
technical and tactical factors together in battle will
transform the combat inputs into combat outputs by producing
effects which will be called human, target, and operational
effects. This section scrutinizes the combined effects of
operational, target, and human effects. The latter are
obviously human reactions to enemy fire in the combat
environment. A loolc at a simplified schematic model of a
section of combat interaction will facilitate a better
understanding of the ideas involved. See Fig 3 .
The antagonistic missons of friend and enemy permit them
to move under some time constraint towards their respective
objectives. Objectives contain enemy targets. Targets
consist of a firer, a weapon or both. Fire that hits targets
can attrit, wound or damage, and thus produce physical
target effects. Fire that misses targets forces the soldiers
close to the impact point to undergo certain rea::tions, and








Fire effectiveness aay therefore be split into two
causative components. The Psychological Research Associates
[Ref. 6] put it this way:
Fire effectiveness may be divided into two components:
physical and psychological effects of fire. The physical
effects of fire are to fcill or to wound and thus reduce
the number of enemy who are able to return fire. The
psychological effect of fire is to neutralize the enemy
and thus reduce the amount of battle time during whicn
the enemy is willing to return fire.
Psychological effects will be produced initially by the
senses, specifically the visual, audio, tactile, and
orfactory Iceys resulting from the impacting bullet or shell,
whether it misses the target or by the actual physical
effect of hitting another nearby target. The perception of
that happening induces a fear of being killed and thus
forces the individual to a certain behavior depending on his
psychic hardness. In his report on an "Investigation of
Chinese and North Korean Soldier Reactions to UN Weapons in
the Korean War" L. A. Kahn [Ref. 7] concludes:
The major reason given to reaction to all weapons
studied is that of casualties ; to lesser extents are
noise , efficiency of action, burning (considered
distinct from casualties), restriction of activities,
invulnerability and miscellaneous.
These conclusions are to be expected from intuition. Of
course, they reoccur in almost all definitions for
suppression, such as the one of George M. Gividen [Ref. 8]
A state of relative ineffectiveness or incapacitation
of the individual soldier which is a function of
psychological factors and which is either initiated or
maintained by a perceived threat from weapons fire.
Gividen also distinguishes five different kinds of
suppression which, are consequences of different tactical
situations and of different types of fire. Since the degree
of suppression depends on this as well as on the
28

psychological stability of the soldier, a closer look into
these five dimensions of suppression seems to be necessary
in order to understand the mechanics involved In gaining
fire superiority.
1. Reasoned (rational) suppression versus unreasoned
(irrational) suppression. In the first case, the soldier
stays cool, keeps his head down and rationally analyzes and
calculates the situation and his survival probability. This
is opposed to the secoad case, in which the panicking
soldier does not consciously consider the real nature of the
threat or its long term effects.
2. Area suppression versus point suppression. It can
be best described by randomly distributed machine gun fire
over an area, or even mortar fire as opposed to the aimed
fire of a sniper. The weapon best suited for point
suppression may be useless for area suppression and vice
versa.
3. Defensive suppression versus offensive suppression.
Defensive suppression can be obtained most effectively
against attacking infantry by macaine gun fire, whereas the
offensive suppression to support an attack can be best
obtained by mor-ca r fire.
4. Lethal suppression versus denial suppression.
Lethal suppression neutralizes an enemy's movement and
actions in the area in which he is caught by fire, whereas
denial suppression keeps him out: of heretofore unoccupied
areas.
5. Direct fire suppression versus indirect fire
suppression. This dimension is characterized by the firing




For the sake of completeness the following sixth item should
be added to the above:
6. Permanent suppression versus no suppression. k
soldier who has been Icilled, severely wounded or suffered
severe psychological shock can not engage in further combat
and is considered permanent suppressed. This is in
opposition to a soldier who experienced no effective
suppression and is therefore undegraded.
These distinctions of suppressive situations and the
kind of weapons and fire involved reflect the multitude of
possible psychological processes in soldiers under fire.
Further information about suppression may be foand in the
report of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group
[Ref. 9] which provides a: "Schematic description of the
sequence of processes that are conjectured to occur in a
single time slice when suppressive fire is delivered and



















The symptoms of suppcassion may also be illastrated from
the point of view of battle stress and the human
performance. Stress, per se, is not harmful unless it
exceeds certain tolerable dimensions. They are reached when
the individual's actions begin to be degraded by physical,
physiological and psychological immissions, which change the
person's interior biological, chemical and mental balance.
This can lead to totally different reactions in the same
situation. One person might keep a cool, clear head and wait
until the imminent danger or threat is over. The other
person might brealc mentally and become incapacitated. Still
another person might experience a total loss of
self-discipline and self-consciousness, begin to panic and
act in ways he would have never acted when unshaken.
Finally, another person might, induced by fear and
hopelessness, react bravely with courage and accomplish
heroic deeds no one would have expected from him.
If one now looks at i section of combat very closely,
one can focus on the single soldier and his weapon. Keeping
the human parameters, and especially the combat soldier
parameters, in mind tie following illustrates how a short
burst of fire onto human targets produces different effects
on the soldiers in the target area at the same time. See
Figure 5 and Figure 6 . In the configuration of Fig 5 the













ALL TARGETS HAVE THE SAME TRAINING, EXPERIENCE, MORAI£, TOUGHNESS




B) TARGET EFFECT ON 3, U, 7, 6 - PSYCHOLOGICAL - SUPPRESSION
EFFECT
C) TARGET EFFECT ON 1, 2, 8, 9 - NO EFFECT NO SUPPRESSION
Figure 5 - EFFECTS OF OE^ FRAGMENTING FIRS ON HJMAN TARGETS
WITH THE SAilE INDIVIDQAL FACTORS. (SCHEMATIC)
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It is obvioas that a target -chat has b^eii hit becomes
damaged, wounded, or IciLied. In other words, it has become
permanently suppressed. Thus, suppressed soliiers are
closer and concentrically grouped around the impact of the
fire than are the unsuppressed soldiers. This hypothesis can
be substantiated by actual combat obs.ervations as well as by
field experiments dealing both witn fragmentation and non
fragmentation weapons, as was dooe by Wesley W. Yale and
Donald L. :iills [Ref. 10] and by Willard S. Vaughan, Jr. and
Peyton G. Wallcer [Ref. 6] respectively. In the
configuration of Fig 6 the targets have different training,
















TARGETS HAVE DIFFERENT TRAININQ, EIPERIENCS, MORALE, TOUGHNESS
TARGET 5, 6, 7 WITH MUCH ]
TARGET 1, 2 WITH FEW >TRAININQ, EXPERIENCE, MORALE, TOUGHNESS
TARGET 3, h, 8, 9 WITH NORMAL,




fl) TARGET EFFECT ON i, 2, 3, h - PSYCHOLOGICAL = SUPPHi:^SION
EFFECT
C) TARGET EFFECT ON 6, 7, 8, 9 - NO EFFECT - NO SUPPRESSION
Figure 6 - EFF3CTS 3? ^D'<i FRAG.1ENTING FIRS ON 'dUUkU TARGETS
WITH DIFFERENT INDIVIDUAL FACrOHS. (SCHEMATIC)
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Observations in combit confirm that soldiers with better
developed qualities of a soldier or combatant parameters
become suppressed at a later time, if at all, than soldiers
•rfith less developed combatant skills. Other human qualities
like intellect cause soldiers to react quite differently.
Reasoned or rational suppression might begin sooner in
intellectual persons because rational analyzation of the
situation may signal a real danger. Combat observations
support evidence that mentally untrained or naive soldiers
were often suppressed to a lesser degree than educated
soldiers. This was mainly due to the fact that these
individuals often had a less clear understanding of the
potential danger and thus did not perceive the threat
situations when they in fact existed. This can also be
supported by the findings of Mitchell H. Berkun [Ref. 11] in
a report about performance decrement under psychological
stress. The suppression threshold of soldiers with combat
experience, good training, lorale and toughness saems to lie
at a higher level than for soldiers without it. The before
mentioned report of Col. Wesley W. Yale and Donald L. Mills
[Ref. 10] indicates that the combat experience of soldiers
allows closer neutralization proximities than it does for
those witn less, or no, combat experience. Yet these
soldiers suffer the fewer losses.
This common observation in war is because they can act
together more harmoniously as a combat team and thus fire
more effectively than unexperienced and untrained soldiers.
They also are able to anticipate better certain enemy
actions or reactions. The experience factor of how lethal
different enemy weapons are and thus how safe the soldier
still is, despite inconing fira, makes up the great
advantage battle seasoned troops have over "graenhorns".
The more the enemy's actions can be anticipated, i.e. the
more his actions are predictable, the less he appears




Generalma jor a.D. F. W. von MelleathinS pointed out that
unanticipated German actions at the Eastern Front had
catastrophic impact on the Russian troops, for they could
not cope rfith the shock of surprise. Only troops with high
morale were able to do so. Later oq the Western Front the
Americans were not feared very much by the Germans despite
the American techaological and material superiority, because
they were too predictable.
Many of the successes of the German Army in WWII, though
mostly outnumbered by the Allied Forces in manpower and
material, suggest a coQclusion similar to Colonel (USA,
fiet.) T.N. Du Puy' s3 statements during his report on his
Quantified Judgement lethod, that superior leadership,
combat soldier qualities such as high spirit, experience and
training and combat unit qualities as esprit de corps can.
offset the effectiveness of enemy fire and increase the
effectiveness of one's own fire. It should be remarked at
this point that tactical aanuals are based more or less on
that principle and that all military education and training
is aimed to develop these qualities.
Physical effects of a bullet or shell hitting a soldier
can not be reduced by his actions. A soldier hit is attrited
or woundea and therefore permanently suppressed. Employing
his military skills and acting according to the situation he
may, to a certain degree, decrease the probability of become
hit. Good training, experience, morale, toughness and an
existing willingness to fight and not to give up will aid in
his survival.
2 During an interview with the author on may 15th, 1979
in Monterey, California. From Nov. 1942 - Sept. 1944 on the
Eastern Front, Major General (Ret.) F. W. von Mellenthin was
Chief of Staff of the 43. Panzer Sorps and later 4. Panzer
j^T* 01 p g3* During a presentation of his Quantified Judaement
Method (QJMf, at the as Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, Calif ornia, March 5th and 6th 1979. Colonel (USA.
Ret.) T. N. Du Puy is Executive Director of the Historical
Evaluation and Research Drganisation (HERO) , a subsidiary of
T.N. Du Puy and Associates.
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Having avoided a direct hit and its physical affects, the
Impact will still produce a psychological effect.
Physical and psychological effects are the result of
human beings in an operational environment exposed to target
effects. Attrition, wounds, damage, and suppression are the
physical and psychological effects respectively, resulting
from combat. Since these combat effects are dependent on
the combat inputs it may be concluded that fire superiority
can also be described in terms of combat outputs. In battle
the gaining of fire superiority is determined when enough
enemy soldiers are killed or wounded, enough material has
been damaged and enough enemy soldiers have been suppressed
so that the enemy can not further or temporarily engage in
combat. The term enough is of course only the common
language description of the guotient of the actual fire
effectiveness of enemy ani friend. Fire superiority in the
theoretical model thus could be represented in either of two
ways. It could be done in terms of combat inputs or combat
outputs.
It will have been noted that the human parameters
received very strong attention. This is because they are so
complex, poorly understood and very influential on combat.
They can not be put away with only a few woris. The large
number of suppression studies reflects the interest in the
human component in battle. Therefore it is only logical to
attempt an association with other factors to find out how
these factors are interrelated.
It is perhaps interesting to note at this point, that
also eguipment, e.g. radar, although having nothing in
common with psychological effects, can be suppressed. This
happens when Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) cruise in the
proximity of a suspected enemy radar tracking station. When
the radar emitter beams signals the RP7 also receives this
signal and zeroes in. Since the HP7 can cruise for several
hours it can harass or even suppress the enemy radar
activities, thus rendering the missile site ineffective.
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E. HUMAN PARAMETERS IN C3MBAT
In literature, battles have been narrated or reconstrncted
numerous times. Sometimes they have been described in minute
detail, listing numbers of weapons, personnel and all the
rest of the relevant military details. But seemingly they
all do not represent the human aspect with the same
exactness, -chough single heroic actions are often mentioned.
Battles in which fire superiority have been gaiaed by bare
firepower will not be presented. Standard cases of this
icind can be found in John Ellis boolc "The Social History of
the Machine Gun " . [Ref. 12] Instead examples shedding light
on cases not so obviously involving human parameters and
producing human or psychological effects will be presented.
The most striking example for suppression in its worst
form, in fact so bad that the affected individuals might
have to undergo psychiatric care is S. L. A. Marshal's [Ref.
5] description of suppressed American soldiers on Omaha
Beach on the afternoon of D - day, Juae 6, 1944:
They lay there motionless and staring into space. They
were so thoroughly shocked that. they had no
consciousness of what went on. Many had forgotten that
they had firearms to use. Others who had lost their
firearms did not seem to know that there were weapons
lying all around them. Some could not hold a weapon
after it was forced into their hands Their nerves
were spent and nothing could be done about them.
This example might help to illustrate further what was




An example which underlines how important leadership, morale
and all the other human factors involved are, is the
description of an episode in the Polish Campaign in WWII*:
After the 4. Panzer Division- together with the
attached "SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (an elite
unit), had penetrated into Warsaw aad had been embraced
by Polish troops, one bad news followed the other. We
were inferior in respect to forces, had been cut off and
were suffering heavy casualties. ...We all at the
Division Headquarters were tired to death following the
several days long fighting and General Reinhardt. the
Division Commander, shouted in a momentary weakness
caused by extreme overlDad and stress: "This is too much,
this is too much". ...Seconds later, Sepp Dietrich, the
commander of the Leibstandarte which also had been
fighting with the courage of the desperate entered the
Division Headquarters and reported to the General:
"Herr General the Leibstandarte is totally exhausted,
you have to draw it baclc. " Reinhardt said nothing for a
short moment- looked deep into his eyes, stepoei towards
him and ait his flat hand on his shoulder saying: "Sepo
- Do you know who is the opponent of the Leiostandarte?''
"No Herr General." - "The Leibstandarte Pilsudsky."
Dietrich flinched, raised himself, viewed the General
shortly with understanding eyes and replied simply:
"Herr General, I thank you. The Leiostandarte will hold
the positions." The Leibstandarte actually held
position and at the next morning the crisis had been
solved.
This episode adresses almost all aspects of the human
parameters and serves as an excellent example of a leader's
personality, his self-control, as a master of the situation
and a model to his men. The mood of the soldiers was
degraded by the experience of failure. Self-confidence and
the feeling of being elite was lost because of the heavy
casualty toll and the unaxpected tough situation. After
they were told that the enemy was also an elite unit who
knew how to fight, their spirit and motivation was
reestablished as well as their self- confidence. This
restored their elite feeling and trust in their own
abilities since they now knew why their efforts were so
ineffective. They were literally spurred on to beat the
enemy and did it. .\ psychological effect inverse to
suppression must have been affected in this case.
This example was excerpted from a letter ( dated May
1, 1979 ) to the author oy his father, H.W. von Fabeck,
Colonel, Federal German ^rmy (Ret) . At the time of these
events in September 1939, v. Fabeck was Major and Adjudant
of General Reinhardt, Commander of the 4. Panzer Division.
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The last exampla, a iascription of a situation at the
Russian Front in jJWIIs, shows how a feeling of superiority
can arise from superior fire and success.
Our field fortifications at the Wolchow frontline were
built very nicely and thoroughly, yielding good cover
and relatively good observation. My batallion was
decimated to only 7 Dfficers, 234 NCO's and anlisted
men, but we had, apart from artillery, which was used
only in emergency cases, 96 machineguns, including booty
weapons. This gave us enormous fire power, though we had
to defend about 5.5 kilometers of frontline against an
en^my who could not use tanks because of ths swampy
ground. All enemy attacks could be repelled
successfully during this four lonth mission, leading to
a build up of a superiority feeling in the men despite
our insufficient and outnumbered forces. The daily
artillery and gr enadet hrower attacks didn't cause too
much harm to us m the swampy area and had almost no
influence on the spirit of the troops.
It must be emphasized that fire superiority can not be
gained when the destructive fire of weapons is not
available. The highest ranking human parameters cannot
replace fire and cannot absorb the effect of fire. But
coupled with correct tactical behaviour human parameters can
reduce the direct and indirect effects of enemy fire and can
increase the effectiveness of one's own fire.
5 This example was coimanicated to the author by his
father in law, R. Hoerr, Chief of Police (Ret)
^
in a letter
dated May 15, 1979. The incident occurred m the late
summer of 1943, when Hoerr was Captain and Batallion
Commander of the Hamburg Police Batallion, which took part
in the big defensive battles at the Eastern Front.
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III. THE FIRE SUPERIORITY MODEL
A. DEFINITION OF FIRE SOPERIORITY
Tha definition given abovs in sec'ioQ II A has provided an
useful outline of the ideas concerning fire superiority.
The report. Small Aras Wea£on Systems IS A WS^., of the U.S.
Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center, Fort Ord
[Ref. 13] states the following about fire superiority:
The purpose of the infantry fire fight is to gain fire
superiority. Other factors being equal, small arms fire
superiority prevents the enemy's fire or movement,
permitting mission accoaplishm ent. Achievement of fire
superiority requires two elements:
1. attaining a greater nagnitude of target effects than
the enemy, as a function of time and
2. sustaining this level of target effects longer than
the enemy can sustain his level of target efrects and
long enough to accomplish the mission.
Using the basic ideas of both definitions and including the
input parameters as a descriptor of uhe scenario in which
fire superiority is gained, fire superiority can
conceptually be defined in the following manner:
FIRE SUPERIORITY IS A MORAL AND CULTURAL PHENOMENON THAT
DEPENDS ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION, THE TECHNICAL HARDWARE
AND HUMAN QUALITIES. IT IS RELATIVE, AND IS DETERMINED BY
THE RATIO OF THE INSTANTANEOUS FIRE EFFECTIVENESSES OF ENEMY
AND FRIEND. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF FIRS SUPERIORITY REQUIRES
THE ATTAINING OF A CERTAIN MAGNITUDE OF PHYSICAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS 0« THE ENEMY AND SUSTAINING THESE
EFFECTS LONG ENOUGH TO PREVENT THE ENEMY'S FIRE OR MOVEMENT,
WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY NEUTRALIZING THE PHYSICAL AND THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ENEMY FIRE.
42

B. PROPOSAL FOR A CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Based on the components and the definition of fire
superiority and the relativity of fire effectiveness, a
general model of fire superiority may be explained in the
following ¥ay: Tactical, technical and human parameters
together contribute to the build up of potential fire
effectiveness in combat. The potential fire effectiveness
is the inherent physical threat to the enemy. In the instant
of drawing fire this fire effectiveness may be degraded (by
the influence of tha enemy's human parameters) to
instantaneous actual fire effectiveness. For the enemy, the
actual fire ef factiveness is the perceived threat which he
can not offset anyfurther. The same things happen
simultaneously on the friandly side, so that the "crossover"
of the fire apparently makes up the gaining of fire
superiority. This was previously suggested in figure 2.
Fire superiority thus may be expressed as the integral over
time of the ratio of friendly and enemy instantaneous actual
fire effectiveness:
FS : Fire Superiority
AEe : Actual Fire Effectiveness (Enemy)
AEf : Actual Fire Effectiveness (Friend)
T=0 : Time when combat starts
T=t : Time when combat ends
The concept of the "crossover" of the actual fire
effectiveness is illustrated in Fig 7.
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POTENTIAL FIRE EFFECTIVENESS (FRIEND)
POTENTIAL FIRE EFFECTIVENESS (ENEf«)
ACTUAL FIRE EFFECTP/ENESS (FRIEND)
ACTUAL FIRE- EFFECTIVENESS (ENE.Ti)




Note that the center between the two vertical dashed lines
includes only the actual fire effectiveness of the opposing
forces. The potential fira effectiveness is not included.
Since Fig 7 shows symmetry in the model it it is sufficient
to consider only one side in figure 8, in wich greater
detail of t.he components ot fire superiority is depicted.
The following modal illustrates, in general, the descriptive
part of chapter II, "Components of Fire Superiority". The
model is organized in a manner that every term consists of
determining subsets, exactly in the way a tree diagram would
show dependencies . Furthermore the sets and subsets are
arranged consistently so that they, when read vertically
along a column, constitute a collection of equal ranicing or
equally important factors in comoat, which all together
determine the gaining of fire superiority. Wher= terms are
not filled in, the horizontal dotted lines indicate that the
terms placed further to the left also fall into all the next
categories. It is necessary to distinguish between combat
inputs and combat outputs, the latter being denoted by round
brackets
.
In order to avoid misinterpretation of this conceptual model
it must be emphasized that Fig 8 must be read in the
context of Fig 7.
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Figure 3 - THE OVERALL PICT'JRE OF FIRE SUPERIORITY
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Daring the development of this conceptual model it has been
assumed for organizational reasons not to show all possible
interdependencies of the different factors. It is implied
thar the reader has a basic feeling for it since it seems to
be logical, if not obvious, where this is the case.
C. RELEVANCE OF THE COMPONENTS FOR MODELING
The goals which have been set for an analytical model
determine the model input. These goals might state a
required resolution, accuracy, simplicity or amount of
available input. Depending on the scale of combat the
conceptual model of fire superiority offers a variety of
application possibilities.
For small-scale combat at the platoon level, for example,
this model provides very good resolution because of the
amount of detail included. The amount of information might
make the model clumsy but it could give more justification
to the results in the eyes of non-modelers.
For large-scale combat the model is still applicable. In
this case one will have to back up from too much detail
provided by the 'right' columns of the model and go back to
the 'left' two or more steps in the subset classification.
The model will still provide enough detail which can be
utilized with a managable amount of work. The essence of
what has been said is: The more accuracy one wants, the
more information that is needed, and the more work that is
required. Going from the right to the left side of the model
decreases the number of input varialDles but increases the
accessability . Since the three basic parameters, tactical,
technical and human parameters are represented in some form
in each 'column', care is automatically taken that each




The goal of this thesis has been to contribute to a better
understanding of combat by analyzing the factors involved in
the gaining of fire superiority. Having found a way to
conceptually order these factors, it has become obvious that
military OR analysts have not considered human factors in
their combat-modeling efforts. The process of gaining fire
superiority is a complex one, heavily dependent upon human
factors in a givea combat situation, All the complexities
of human reactions, emotions, training, experisnce, morale
etc. increase the difficulty in modeling fire superiority.
Early simple combat models did not include human factors,
and when they Later tried, they only accounted for
suppression processes. Suppression has been modeled and
simulated in various ways in attempts to have more reality
in the models. These attempts wera all considerable
improvements compared to their predecessors. However, models
not including human factors do not seem elaborate enough to
reflect greater reality. The contribution of this thesis is
to be seen from the point that it might provide a basis for
more reality in future modeling.
Follow-up work on this topic is highly desirable. It
could use this thesis as a point of departure and translate
the conceptual model presented here into an analytical one.
This does not mean that one can expect to ever model the
"real thing". However, with a reasonable amount of work one
might develop a realistic model. However, difficulties in
the quantification of all the human parameters still
obstruct the way to a straight forward and 'easy' model.
Future work, including a more realistic assessment of
combat, will hopefully help the military analysts and
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